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Luis López Cordovez* 
This article deals with the effects on agriculture of 
the economic policy associated with the crisis and the 
economic adjustment. The author starts by recount-
ing the most notable features of the macroeconomic 
policies which in relative terms marginalized agri-
culture from the most vigorous stimuluses of growth 
and of the specific policies designed to offset these 
effects. Before the crisis the combination of these 
policies had shaped a complex and costly pattern of 
agricultural development, the results of which were 
successful for a while with respect to the growth of 
agriculture in many countries, but failed with respect 
to equality and alleviation of rural poverty. 
The analysis then focuses on the changes in 
macroeconomic policies made as part of the adjust-
ment, with a view to establishing whether these 
policies worked for or against national agricultures, 
taking into account their effects not only on relative 
prices but also on producers and the structure of 
farming policies. It is stressed that the nucleus of the 
link between macroeconomic policy and agriculture 
is the adjustment of the real effective exchange rate, 
which together with complementary changes in 
monetary, fiscal and wages policy has affected in 
various ways the price ratios of farm goods (interna-
tionally tradeable or not), the external competitive-
ness of agriculture, its production structures, and the 
remuneration of the farm labour force. 
The author emphasizes that the most visible 
adverse effect of the adjustment on agriculture, in 
the short term and with obvious negative projections 
for the medium and long terms, arises from the 
cutback in public expenditure. The big drop in State 
investment in agriculture, in conjunction with the 
meagre reinvestment by farmers, is having a serious 
effect on the rate of capital formation, the use of 
productive resources, and the sector's growth 
potential. 
Lastly he stresses the diversity and complexity 
of the factors which must be taken into consideration 
for a complete picture of the range of repercussions 
of the crisis, especially when the analysis seeks to 
clarify questions connected with the losses suffered 
by peasant agriculture and rural social development, 
which according to some information have been 
greater than those suffered by the agribusiness 
economy. 
•Director, Joint KCLAC/FAO Agriculture Division. 
The author is grateful for the collaboration of Mr. Pedro 
Tejo, 
I 
Economic policy and 
agriculture in 
the 1970s 
1. Macroeconomic policies 
and agriculture 
Since the Second World War many of the coun-
tries of Latin America and the Caribbean have 
undergone a profound and extensive process of 
economic and social transformation as a result of 
the predominance of a modernization model 
centred on the formation of urban-industrial 
societies. The main lines of the model provided 
by the developed countries were followed for 
this purpose, although different courses were 
taken in the attainment of the objective. 
The economic strategies designed to achieve 
development through protected industrializa-
tion (known as domestic-market oriented) and 
interventionist policies entailed the adoption of 
macroeconomic policies focused basically on the 
attainment of the pustulated goals of rapid 
industrial growth. Here special importance 
accrued to the macroeconomic variables which 
protected and made possible the expansion of 
the various branches manufacturing durable and 
non-durable consumer goods, intermediate 
inputs and capital goods. 
The intensification of the industrialization 
strategy throughout the 1970s implied an alloca-
tion of resources clearly in favour of manufactur-
ing and mainly to the detriment of the interests 
of the farm sector; as a result the macroeconomic 
policies adopted for this purpose were diversi-
fied and improved into a complex set of eco-
nomic policy tools determining the intersectoral 
allocation of resources and the relative profita-
bility of the production sectors. 
In addition to making the import of manu-
factures more difficult, the State transferred to 
industry resources drawn directly and indirectly 
from the rest of the economy —mainly from 
agriculture— in order to facilitate the accumula-
tion of capital in that sector. It also transformed 
the physical and educational infrastructures, 
adapting them to the needs of industrialization, 
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and in many cases it used public revenue to 
install basic industrial infrastructure. It was an 
important condition of these strategies that food 
prices should be kept low, owing to their impor-
tance for the determination of the basic wages in 
the economy and for the evolution of consump-
tion and employment. 
In order to stimulate and strengthen indus-
trialization —gradually or rapidly, depending on 
the case— more powerful macroeconomic poli-
cies were brought into play. This involved dis-
crimination against the production of 
internationally tradeable goods: non-industrial 
exports and imports substitutes. This bias had 
adverse effects on agriculture, for a large propor-
tion of its output is tradeable. In order to correct 
and offset these effects, specific policy measures 
were devised and applied in favour of unpro-
tected farm production. 
The sector's development was thus linked to 
industrialization, owing both to the importance 
that the countryside might acquire as a market 
for the expansion of manufacturing and to the 
fact that agriculture is a generator of wage goods. 
In order to guarantee this key function in urban 
and industrial growth, most of the countries 
gave strong support to modernization, under-
stood as a means of ensuring that the sector is 
more receptive to the technical progress 
required for the reduction of costs, the expansion 
and diversification of exports and the increased 
production of foodstuffs and the raw materials 
needed by industry. 
The studies carried out by the Joint ECLAC/ 
FAO Agriculture Division in several countries of 
the region1 demonstrate the influence which 
macroeconomic policies then had on the devel-
opment of the sector's economy and farm poli-
cies, and at the same time they show the great 
heterogeneity of national situations and expe-
rience in this respect, which makes generaliza-
tion difficult. Some perceptions of regional 
application are nevertheless presented, on the 
basis of the common elements and factors which 
can be identified and of the interrelationships 
and links between macroeconomic policy and 
agriculture. 
'See below the extracts from the studies on Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru presented 
to the tiCLAC/FAO Round Table on Crisis, Adjustment Policies and 
Agriculture, held at Santiago, Chile, from 26 to 29 May 1987. 
In the past decade and up to the beginning of 
the 1980s real exchange rates were constantly 
revalued, hurting agriculture and benefitting the 
production of manufactures. The exchange-rate 
policy did not stimulate the expansion and diver-
sification of farm exports (which grew at 2.8 % a 
year) or the substitution of farm imports; on the 
contrary, these imports grew steadily (at 10.2% 
a year), thus increasing the region's food 
dependency. 
The adjustments which were then made to 
the real exchange rate had a heavy impact on the 
production structure of the national economies 
by altering the relative prices of internationally 
tradeable goods and goods tradeable within 
national frontiers. 
Before the crisis and the adjustment the 
countries used a wide variety of trade-policy 
mechanisms. The tariffs were used as the main 
method of controlling their purchases from 
abroad, supplemented by taxes and other para-
tariff mechanisms. Tariffs, taxes, quotas and 
other means were also employed to limit certain 
exports. Various trade-policy mechanisms were 
also used to promote sales abroad. 
As a general rule, these trade policies 
included reduced protection for agriculture and 
in particular for the food-production subsector, 
in comparison with the protection afforded to 
other production sectors, especially industry. 
Accordingly, the tariffs affected farm profitabil-
ity considerably less than in the case of 
manufactures. 
This reduced protection for agriculture was 
consistent with the decisions taken by the State 
to maintain low food prices for political and 
social reasons. This benefit to consumers 
improved their real incomes and thus facilitated 
the anti-inflation effort, but foodstuffs produc-
ers suffered. 
Farm exports generally received lower net 
subsidies to offset the tariffs than did industrial 
exports; this worsened the relative position of 
agriculture. The taxes and restrictions on farm 
exports were due both to the intention to hold 
food prices down and to fiscal factors. 
Before the crisis credit policies and interest 
rates openly favoured agriculture in the majority 
of the countries of the region. The volumes of 
official lending to agriculture increased consider-
ably, and the credit was granted at preferential 
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interest rates. This led to profound financial 
dependency and overborrowing by a large pro-
portion of the big and medium-sized farmers; in 
contrast, peasant agriculture scarcely benefitted 
from the credit policy. Between 1975 and 1981 
the expansion of official credit in constant terms 
ranged from 50 to 100%, depending on the 
country. 
In the second half of the 1970s the central-
ized expenditure of the institutions and enter-
prises which formed the public farming 
apparatus remained relatively stable as a propor-
tion of total public expenditure. It even increased 
slightly in some countries, such as Ecuador, Mex-
ico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia. 
State investment in agriculture certainly 
contributed to its economic growth; the purpose 
was to encourage, direct and facilitate private 
investment, and State investment had a pro-
nounced and vigorous effect on the performance 
and composition of production. Roughly 10% of 
Latin America's farm production in the past 
three decades was due to incentives of various 
kinds generated by public agricultural invest-
ment. This was concentrated coincidentally and 
on a sustained basis in irrigation works, land 
improvement, upgrading of storage facilities 
and marketing, and the purchase of the machin-
ery and equipment needed by the research and 
technical assistance services. It was also incorpo-
rated in the State programmes for promotion of 
production, training, research, extension, forma-
tion of co-operatives, agrarian reform and rural 
settlement and development. 
2. Specific policies in favour 
of agriculture 
The increasing integration of agriculture in the 
national and international economies and the 
consequent tightening of intersectoral ties 
meant that in the past decade the external sector 
and the macroeconomic framework accentuated 
their decisive role in the structure, intensity and 
periodicity of the measures and tools of eco-
nomic policy used specifically for agriculture, 
and therefore that they both had a great influ-
ence on the sector's economic results, on the 
welfare of its production agents, and on the 
distribution of farm income. 
In the 1970s big changes occurred in relative 
dometic prices, owing both to movements in the 
international prices of the goods which the 
region exported and to the planning and man-
agement of general economic policy. The contra-
dictory effects of the movements in farm prices 
are well known. When they remained low the 
real income of consumers increased and that of 
producers declined; in several countries and in 
specific periods this led to the stagnation of 
agriculture and the persistence or aggravation of 
rural poverty. The increase in farm prices had a 
decisive influence on the rate of increase of pro-
duction, the formation of capital, and technolog-
ical change in agriculture; but in the long term 
this increase tended to decline, owing both to the 
pressures brought to bear in this direction by the 
increasing output and to the stagnation or dim-
inution of the real income of poor urban dwellers 
and landless farm workers. In view of the impor-
tance and the many implications of the move-
ments in farm prices, in particular those of food, 
the governments evised and carried out various 
kinds of institutional intervention designed to 
control or offset their undesired political effects, 
ensure industrial growth and benefit consumers. 
The persistent distortions in farm prices 
influenced the slow but steady introduction of 
measures and tools of economic policy in favour 
of certain farm products, such as tariff preferen-
ces, subsidized loans, supply of capital goods and 
technical equipment and inputs at reduced pri-
ces, direct subsidies, tax benefits, and transfers of 
income by means of public agricultural invest-
ment and technical support programmes for 
production, and the provision of social services 
in rural areas. These policy measures and tools 
proved in practice to be means of improving the 
profitability of farming activities affected by the 
low level of prices; this increased the real income 
of big and medium-sized producers but it offered 
little or no compensation to peasant farmers for 
the extraction of their economic surplus. 
3. The economistic emphasis 
of farm policies 
In the 1970s most of the countries of the region 
applied or tried to apply integral treatment to 
the farming sector, with a view to solving the 
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problem of land ownership and the consequent 
social and political pressures, and to devising and 
introducing policy incentives and concrete pro-
grammes of production support to encourage 
the adoption of technology "packages" by agri-
cultural production units. This modernization 
was extremely differentiated in terms of the 
capacity of the various socio-productive agents 
to incorporate themselves in it and take advan-
tage of its benefits. The incentives provided by 
the State, by the domestic demand for foodstuffs, 
and by the possibilities of exports and imports 
substitution were bringing about changes in the 
structure of agricultural production in the coun-
tries in accordance with the levels of profitability 
of the different products and with the character-
istics of the different types of production unit. 
These changes were reflected in different 
growth rates for the farm goods produced, and in 
changes in the composition of production and 
land use. 
It is important to underline the action of the 
State in promoting changes in the structure of 
agricultural production and in supporting 
advances in the technological model adopted by 
the big and medium-sized production units 
—the owners of which took on the role of 
dynamic agents in the countryside— producing 
mainly for export and for imports substitution 
(especially sugar cane for alcohol production in 
Brazil) and to meet the expanding urban 
demand. 
Chile stands out as a special case in respect of 
the role played by the State in favour of agricul-
ture before the crisis, for State intervention in 
agriculture was reduced or eliminated after 1973 
on the ground that the sector did not need any 
special policy measures and that the State should 
not intervene in its operations at all or to only a 
minimum extent. 
Generally speaking, the specific policies in 
favour of agriculture in the region had the main 
objective of accelerating the annual growth rate 
of the production of food and other farm goods, 
and the results were fairly satisfactory. The 
structure of these policies and the tools used in 
them made sustained production increases pos-
sible and the domestic supply of farm goods 
more flexible. Regional growth rates in the sec-
tor's output in excess of 3 % , as an annual aver-
age over many years, indicate the real 
effectiveness of the public policies for agricultu-
ral growth and the capacity of economic agricul-
tural institutions and agents to take advantage of 
the opportunities that the markets offered. 
A whole series of changes and advances took 
place owing to the stimulus of official policies 
and programmes which sought to develop scien-
tific research, vocational training, the produc-
tion of technological inputs and their 
dissemination, the transfer and adoption of tech-
nology, the formation of capital, the improve-
ment of the physical infrastructure, the 
adaptation of markets, the establishment of 
agro-industries, and the expansion and diversifi-
cation of farm exports. 
The main factor in the growth of agricultural 
output since the 1970s has been the formation of 
capital, expressed in different kinds of property 
investment and the adoption of technological 
systems based on "packages" with various mixes 
of machinery and equipment, agrochemical pro-
ducts, biological inputs and irrigation, destined 
mainly for medium-sized and large economic 
units. The management of modern farming 
enterprises has become steadily more complex 
and the network of links with industry, the 
financial system, the State and public agricultu-
ral institutions, and with the big domestic and 
foreign economic agents in general has 
expanded. To the differences resulting from the 
distribution of land have been added differences 
in the accumulation of capital and in the use of 
technological innovations, and the changes in 
the nature and intensity of the use of labour. 
In the light of the economic results obtained 
from the application of the policies and pro-
grammes designed to change the structure of 
farming, the national economic authorities 
argued that the main structural transformations 
in the countryside had already been achieved, 
and that the modernization of agriculture, in 
addition to its obvious and indisputable eco-
nomic successes, had produced more profound 
changes than had agrarian reform. They there-
fore tried to ensure in the pre-crisis manage-
ment of agricultural development that the 
efficient use of land should take precedence over 
the peasants' demands for land, as an essential 
condition for enabling the sector to respond 
appropriately to the functions assigned to it by 
the rest of the economic system and to ensure 
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concrete progress with respect to food security. 
The widespread concern in the 1970s with social 
change in the countryside was replaced by a 
determination to boost and guarantee the eco-
nomic growth of agriculture. 
These circumstances and pressures helped to 
ensure that the nucleus of most of the recent 
strategies for agricultural development con-
sisted coincidentally of measures and tools of 
economic policy which direct and stimulate the 
production process. This nucleus of agricultural 
policy has been backed up by transfers of income 
(through public investment and direct subsi-
dies), transfers of technology {through produc-
tion support programmes), and improvement 
and extension of social benefits in rural areas. 
The production results of the rural develop-
ment programmes were generally positive, and 
the proposed targets for improvement of the 
physical infrastructure were largely attained, but 
the social achievements were very limited and 
did not compensate for the negative effects of 
the imbalances of specialization which charac-
terized the modernization of production based 
on the agribusiness economy. As a result the 
structural heterogeneity of agriculture and the 
unbalanced distribution of income were accentu-
ated in many countries, so that rural poverty 
remained unchanged or even increased. The 
State was unable to ensure that broad rural social 
1. The economic crisis 
From 1981 the majority of the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean underwent the most 
widespread, acute, profound and multifaceted 
economic crisis of the last half century. Its conse-
quences were more severe, prolonged and diver-
sified in some countries than in others. It is 
probable that the 1980s will be a decade of lost 
development for many of the region's economies 
and that in a fair number of them the per capita 
sectors incorporated themselves properly in the 
process of technological change or as suppliers 
of food to the big urban markets. 
Agribusiness continued to coexist with pea-
sant farming, each with different amounts of 
land, capital and technology, with different types 
of economic unit and levels of output, productiv-
ity and income, and with different kinds of pro-
duction goal and links with the other sectors of 
the economy and the goods, factor and financial 
markets. The economic and social consequences 
of this dichotomy have been exacerbated by the 
steady increase in the number of landless 
workers and the growing heterogeneity of pro-
duction in terms of resources, technology, pro-
ductivity, employment, income and formation of 
human capital. 
The crisis and the adjustment process 
brought out the structural defects and aggra-
vated the adverse effects of a prevailing model of 
agricultural development which was not centred 
on utilization of national resources to combat 
rural poverty and satisfy basic food needs. On the 
contrary, this model gave preference to the for-
mation of a structure of agricultural production 
designed to respond as efficiently as possible to 
the effective demand generated both by a very 
unequal national distribution of assets and 
income and by the real opportunities for exports 
and development of agro-industry. 
income will be somewhat lower in 1990 than in 
1980. 
The crisis affected the big economies of the 
region as well as the small and medium-sized 
ones: the oil-exporting countries and those 
totally dependent on imports for their fuel 
supply; the relatively more developed economies 
and the poorer ones with less diversified produc-
tion structures; countries which introduced 
interventionist strategies and policies focused on 
the domestic market and countries which 
II 
The crisis, the adjustment process and 
their effects on agriculture 
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pursued strategies of open development based 
on the free play of market forces. 
The growth rate of the regional domestic 
product fell sharply in 1981; in 1982 it declined 
in absolute terms —something that had not hap-
pened in the previous 40 years— and it fell even 
further in 1983. The downward trend was halted 
in 1984, but the growth in economic activity was 
small; the rate worsened again in 1985, but 1986 
saw a return to the 1984 rate of increase; it seems 
that 1987 will have been less favourable than 
1986. 
The exceptional nature of the crisis was also 
apparent in the simultaneous and persistent 
deterioration in the main economic indicators. 
Output fell, affecting the formation of capital; 
the employment situation worsened and the real 
wages of the labour force declined. At the same 
time inflationary processes were accentuated 
and became widespread, and the problems of the 
external sector were exacerbated. 
ECLAC has shown in its studies and reports 
that the gestation and evolution of the crisis was 
affected by many different internal factors which 
were both structural and temporary and not only 
economic in nature but also political and social; 
nevertheless the influence of two external fac-
tors was particularly decisive. 
In fact the main factors which triggered the 
crisis, after several years of steady weakening of 
external demand, were the sharp fall in the net 
inflow of capital in 1982 and the enormous 
increase in the net payments of profits and inter-
est abroad which occurred at the same time. This 
double effect reached exceptional proportions, 
given that the net inflow of loans and invest-
ments, which had increased markedly and stead-
ily throughout almost the whole of the previous 
decade and which reached an all-time high of 
more than US$37 000 million in 1981, fell 
sharply from 1982 onwards. At the same time 
net remittances of interest and profits rose. As a 
result of these changes and although trade in 
goods showed a large surplus, the current 
account deficit of the balance of payments 
remained above US$40 000 million in 1982. The 
vertical drop in the flow of loans and foreign 
investments and the sizeable flight of capital 
meant that more than half of the negative bal-
ance of the current account had to be financed 
from international reserves, which declined 
considerably. 
2. The adjustment process 
The countries of the region were thus faced with 
a serious imbalance in their current accounts 
which could not be financed by a net inflow of 
loans and investments, and they were compelled 
to initiate an adjustment process. To this end 
many of them with differing intensity and 
methods and at different times, introduced two 
groups of macroeconomic policy designed to 
achieve economic and financial adjustment. 
Essentially these groups included measures to 
increase the relative prices of internationally 
tradeable goods by means of exchange-rate and 
foreign-trade policies and to control the aggre-
gate demand by means of monetary, fiscal and 
wages policies. These measures were backed up 
by a reduction in real expenditure —mainly in 
the investments made by the State— and by 
other policies designed to cut back imports and 
increase imports substitution. 
As a rule the adjustment policies came 
within the framework of the credit agreements 
established with the International Monetary 
Fund. These agreements included monetary and 
fiscal restrictions and required the governments 
to reduce their deficits by increasing taxation, 
raising the tariffs of public sector enterprises, 
and reducing current expenditure. It was usually 
accepted that during the adjustment the 
exchange rate would rise, real wages fall, and 
positive interest rates be mantained in real 
terms. 
The rigour and persistence with which the 
agreed policies were carried out m practice dif-
fered from country to country, as did the degree 
to which the countries attained their basic goals. 
The region as a whole reduced its imbalance 
remarkably quickly. 
However, the manner and time periods in 
which this progress was achieved entailed a high 
cost in the contraction of economic activity and 
employment. Almost the whole burden of the 
correction of the large initial external imbalance 
fell on imports, the brutal reduction of which, in 
close conjunction with the restriction of demand, 
made the adjustment a recessionary one. 
Moreover, the expansion of exports was 
impeded by the large and sustained fall in the 
international prices of most of the main com-
modities exported by the region and by the 
decline in the volume of world trade resulting 
CRISIS, ADJUSTMENT POLICIES AND AGRICULTURE / L. López Cordoeez 13 
from the prolonged recession in the industrial-
ized countries, and by the increased protection-
ism in many of them. 
The service of the foreign debt has meant a 
net transfer of financial resources out of the 
region, which amounted on average to 
US$30 000 million in 1983-1985 and US$22 000 
million in 1986, and may fall to under 
US$12 000 million in 1987. This fall is due to the 
fact that more countries are limiting these net 
transfers abroad in order to have the foreign 
exchange to pay for the imports which they need 
to sustain an essential minimum of economic 
activity. 
In summary, the process of economic and 
financial adjustment generated remarkable 
changes in the relationships between the various 
macroeconomic variables. Especially in those 
related to the external sector. These changes 
have induced genuine structural transformations 
in basic areas of the functioning of the national 
economies. Agriculture has been involved in 
these transformations, in ways and with conse-
quences which will now be examined. 
3. The effects of the crisis 
and the adjustment on 
agriculture 
a) Macroeconomic policies and their impact on 
agriculture 
Since agriculture forms an important part of 
a vast and complex network of economic interre-
lationships, the changes introduced in other 
areas of the network, in macroeconomic policies 
in particular, had differing effects, depending on 
the importance and the functions of each of 
these policies, both on the sector's economic 
performance and on the structure and nature of 
the specific policy measures and mechanisms. 
As was stated in the previous section, pre-
crisis economic management was typically 
biased against the production of tradeable goods, 
and this had harmful effects, indirectly or 
directly, on the profitability of agricultural eco-
nomic units and therefore on the economic vital-
ity of the sector. In order to mitigate or correct 
these effects (which were sometimes openly rec-
ognized), a complex set of policy measures was 
devised and introduced specifically for agricul-
ture, achieving the particular purpose of correct-
ing, with various degrees of effectiveness, the 
most undesirable distortions and consequences 
of the macroeconomic policies. 
There thus emerged a practical combination 
of macroeconomic policies biased against agri-
culture which denied the sector in relative terms 
the most vigorous stimuluses of growth and the 
specific policies designed to correct this very 
problem. The facts show that in Latin America 
as a whole, and with respect to the growth of the 
region's agriculture, the corrective or compensa-
tory policies virtually nullified the direct and 
indirect adverse effects of macroeconomic man-
agement. The region's farm product grew at 
almost 3-5% per year in the 1970s, a rate not 
very far below its estimated potential growth 
rate of around 4.5% a year. 
It must be stressed that the combination of 
biased and compensatory policies produced an 
expensive pattern of agricultural development, 
which was by its very nature unsustainable in the 
long term and which in its financing had some 
impact on the national external overindebted-
ness, for it had a high administrative cost. This 
pattern also discouraged the substitution of farm 
imports, and this was exacerbated by the exports 
subsidies introduced by the developed countries. 
What follows is a preliminary attempt 
—given the short period which has so far 
passed— to assess whether the changes in 
macroeconomic policies introduced and imple-
mented as part of the adjustment were favoura-
ble or unfavourable for the region's agriculture. 
As already indicated, these changes were essen-
tially a response to the need to reduce the trade 
and fiscal deficits, which became a basic goal of 
the adjustment. For this reason a fairly common 
pattern of recessionary adjustment predomi-
nated in the region, with differences of degree 
and emphasis in exchange-rate, trade, monetary, 
fiscal and incomes policies; this pattern gener-
ated economic policy decisions designed to raise 
the relative prices of tradeable goods and reduce 
the level of real expenditure. 
Exchange-rate policy has been the most 
powerful macroeconomic tool used in the adjust-
ment process. The countries made sizeable nom-
inal devaluations in order to increase the real 
exchange rate. The rate increases were intro-
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duced in stages until a fairly widespread situation 
was reached in 1987 with a rate higher than in 
the pre-crisis period. 
However, the nominal increases in the 
exchange rate were not always sufficient to 
offset the effects of inflation, which was the 
reason why the exchange rate had been slipping. 
This is what happened in Mexico and Brazil up 
to the beginning of 1983 and in Argentina up to 
the end of 1981. In the other countries studied 
the exchange rate continued to slip until 1982-
1983, except in Colombia where the process con-
tinued until 1984-1985. In Argentina, Costa Rica 
and Mexico specific steps were taken to establish 
new exchange-rate systems and discourage 
exchange-rate speculation. 
Adjustments to exchange-rate parity made it 
possible to achieve, to varying extents, the goal 
of benefitting export goods and stimulating 
imports substitution. There is evidence that the 
adjustments in the real exchange rate had a 
major impact on the formation of the prices of 
the tradeable goods of several countries. They 
also increased the cost of the imported interme-
diate goods and inputs used by the production 
sectors; this negative effect caused more harm to 
the high-technology production of non-
ttadeables which uses a large proportion of such 
goods and inputs. The nominal devaluations had 
an impact on inflation —as was evident in Mex-
ico and Brazil— and this was the reason for the 
intensification of the efforts to stabilize the 
economies. 
The adjustment programmes generally 
assigned to the real exchange rate the role of 
principal regulator of foreign trade. Accordingly, 
the tools of trade policy were used to back up the 
effects of the exchange-rate movements, in par-
ticular those related to exports; trade regulations 
and bureaucratic practices that discriminated 
against foreign sales were eliminated, at least in 
part, while at the same time reductions were 
made in the tariff and other regulations which 
restricted imports. 
This certainly did not mean that the coun-
tries decided to forego the use of tariff and para-
tariff measures to regulate their foreign-trade 
flows but rather that these tools were used in a 
less discriminatory and more selective manner 
than in the past. The changes in exchange-rate 
and trade policies led to a considerable drop in 
the volume of imports and an increase in the 
physical volume of exports. 
Two national situations were exceptions to 
the general rule. Before the crisis of the 1980s 
Chile had likewise reduced its tariffs to very low 
levels, as well as cutting many other taxes and 
removing the restrictions on its foreign trade. It 
also fixed the exchange rate for a long period; 
this led to a considerable revaluation of the 
national currency, with serious consequences for 
importers and exporters. Later, once the crisis 
had set in, it introduced specific tariff surcharges 
to protect certain goods which were subject to 
severe external competition. In Peru, except for 
a short period, trade policy had little relevance in 
the adjustment process. 
The exchange-rate and trade policies consti-
tuted the nucleus of the link between macroeco-
nomic policy and agriculture; the changes made 
in both areas considerably reduced the bias 
against internationally tradeable goods and 
therefore against agriculture. In other words, by 
favouring exports and imports substitution the 
adjustment proved beneficial to agriculture as 
well. 
The effect which the devaluation of the 
exchange rate was expected to have on the struc-
ture of the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable farm products was achieved partially 
in the short term and in a few products and 
countries because the devaluations coincided 
with the large and sustained decline in the inter-
national prices of the main farm products 
exported by the region.2 To this deterioration 
was added the resurgence of inflation, which in 
several cases nullified a large part or all of the 
potential effect of the devaluation on relative 
farm prices. 
The efforts to stabilize the national econo-
mies were generally very vulnerable to the real 
or potential inflationary pressures stemming 
from food prices. There is abundant information 
which shows that when inflation increases, food 
prices rise faster than the prices of the other 
items in the family shopping basket. 
¿In the period 1980-1986 the international prices of sugar, 
cocoa, soybeans, cotton and coffee (coffee recovered in 1986) fell 
steadily from their 1980 levels. Wheat prices fell from 1985 and 
banana prices from 1986. 
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The countries which adopted open develop-
ment strategies before the crisis altered the 
structure and level of their tariffs and freed 
domestic prices. They thus subjected their 
farmers to strong international competition, 
intensified by the relative devaluation of the 
dollar, which caused changes in the composition 
of what was produced and established a very 
close link between the movement of domestic 
food prices and the movement of international 
farm prices. However, between 1983 and 1987 
these countries introduced protectionist mea-
sures —specific tariff surcharges, price bands— 
for certain of their farm products which were 
more vulnerable to the effects of foreign 
competition. 
In the group of countries which opted for 
strategies focused on the domestic market and 
interventionist policies the adjustment process 
had a fairly severe impact on agriculture. The 
devaluations of the real exchange rate increased 
the cost in the national currency of imported 
intermediate goods —an increase which 
accounted for a large part of the rise in their 
production costs. Other elements in this rise 
were the increased cost of money and the elimi-
nation or reduction of production subsidies and 
grants. 
Farming strategies and policies had been 
traditionally designed to promote the profitabil-
ity of soundly irrigated, mechanized, fertilized 
and protected production. Merely as an indica-
tion of the importance of the imported compo-
nent in farm output, mention must be made of 
the results estimated from comparative studies 
on some countries of the region, which show 
that in the 1970s land and labour contributed 
about 15% of the annual growth of the farm 
product, agrochemical inputs almost 40%, and 
technological change the rest. 
The increase in the cost of the imported 
component in farm production, on the one hand, 
and the higher prices of imported foods, on the 
other, argued for an adjustment of producer pri-
ces and thus for a restoration of profit levels. In 
turn, the sharp fall in real farm wages reduced 
the relative weight of remuneration of the work 
force in production costs, thereby neutralizing, 
partly or totally depending on the country, the 
impact on profits of the increased cost of the 
imported component. 
The adjustment generated a general ten-
dency for the freeing of prices, which entailed 
the reduction or elimination of the prices admin-
istered by the State. The mechanisms for control 
of farm prices, which were designed to establish 
an upper limit for the consumer and an adequate 
profit for the producer (traditionally a difficult 
and delicate operation), were removed and the 
participation of the private sector in the market-
ing of farm products was thus strengthened. 
Monetary policy was fairly relaxed in the 
pre-crisis period but turned restrictive during 
the adjustment, becoming one of the principal 
factors in macroeconomic management to 
reduce the aggregate demand. Lending was 
reduced in most of the countries, and in others 
interest-rate subsidies were also removed. In 
Colombia and Ecuador open-market operations 
were carried out in order to attract financial 
resources for lending. In Peru, in addition to the 
reduction of internal credit, public enterprises 
were encouraged to borrow abroad to obtain 
financing. These monetary and credit measures 
caused an increase in the cost of money and 
therefore in production costs as well. This latter 
factor, in conjunction with the tightness of 
credit, forced down the general level of economic 
activity, with adverse consequences for employ-
ment and incomes. 
Initially the adjustment produced a fairly 
widespread fall in the amounts of official lending 
to agriculture and led in some countries to the 
disappearance or considerable reduction of pre-
ferential interest rates. In both cases these mea-
sures entailed the reduction or elimination of 
major subsidies which agriculture had been 
receiving before the crisis. 
Official lending to agriculture was cut back 
appreciably in many countries from 1983, a 
reduction which brought about a sudden shift 
from extreme dependence on this form of 
financing on the part of big and medium-sized 
farmers, who had to resort to self-financing 
from sale of part of their assets —mainly 
livestock— and face up to the financial conse-
quences of their heavier borrowing in the past. 
From 1984 in some countries and from 1985 in 
others the volume of farm credit began to 
increase again but without returning to the lev-
els of the early 1970s. 
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The indebtedness of agriculture increased 
considerably when interest rates reached an 
exceptionally high level. When the subsidies 
designed to offset the effects of the macroeco-
nomic management of the adjustment were 
reduced or removed, farming enterprises came 
to depend basically on price movements and 
macroeconomic decisions, to which they were 
compelled to pay constant attention. 
In Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador 
and Peru, countries which continued to apply 
preferential interest rates to agriculture, the 
negative real rates accentuated this situation, 
moving from an annual average for this group of 
countries of -25% in 1977-1982 to -45% in 
1983-1985 (figure). 
In contrast, in the countries where agricul-
ture paid virtually the real interest rates as the 
rest of the economy, the cost of credit rose, and 
production costs rose with it. The reduction of 
international interest rates in 1985-1986 
lowered financial costs in general and contrib-
uted to a relative recovery of farm profits, but the 
recent sharp rises in these rates have neutralized 
this transitory improvement. 
In the past decade the fiscal deficit remained 
fairly stable in most of the countries, with a 
general tendency to decline slightly, except in 
Figure 
REAL FARM AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST 
RATES IN COUNTRIES OF THE REGION WITH 
INTEREST RATES DIFFERENTIATED BY SECTORS 
(Annual variations) 
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Source: Information taken from the bulletins of the 
countries' central banks (includes: Brazil, 
Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador and Peru). 
some countries in which it was definitely falling. 
In the adjustment process, owing mainly to the 
increased interest payments on the foreign and 
domestic debt, the fiscal deficit initially 
increased; but the contraction of public expendi-
ture, accompanied by changes in its composition, 
reduction and elimination of subsidies, increased 
fiscal revenue (achieved in some countries by 
means of greater tax pressure and adjustment of 
public tariffs), and the subsequent fall in the 
nominal interest rate helped to produce a deficit 
which was lower on average in 1987 than before 
the crisis. 
From 1973 Chile made a considerable reduc-
tion in the size of its public sector. Ecuador and 
Mexico, oil-producing countries which increased 
their fiscal revenue, temporarily raised public 
expenditure on agriculture. In Colombia the big 
public projects were reformulated and taxes 
were raised. Public investment fell in Mexico 
and Argentina. 
Given the weight of the public sector in the 
economies of the countries of the region, these 
fiscal measures had an adverse effect on the 
overall process of productive investment, the 
general level of economic activity and the social 
components in public expenditure. 
The available information, although only 
partial, indicates that from 1983 there was a 
major cutback in public spending on agriculture, 
especially investments and infrastructure, on 
production-support services, and on social 
benefits in rural areas. Thus was accentuated the 
trend in this direction which had begun to estab-
lish itself in some countries of the region in the 
early 1980s. The public institutions responsible 
for the promotion and dissemination of 
improved farming techniques, which had been 
set up and had been maturing throughout the 
past 25 years, had major assets and staffs of 
scientists working on agricultural research and 
extension. In the present circumstances the lack 
of continuity in their work is the main threat to 
these institutions and it stems from reduced and 
unstable annual budgets. There has been discon-
tinuity in the research work and loss of momen-
tum and even backsliding in the programmes, 
which reflects the lack of a proper appreciation 
on the part of the governments of the actual and 
potential value of the national scientific and 
technological base for agricultural development. 
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The budget cuts have restricted and even broken 
up the rural development programmes and have 
thereby seriously weakened social policy for 
rural areas. 
The wages policy adopted in the adjustment 
process was linked to the objective of cutting 
back aggregate demand. Real wages fell, mainly 
as a result of the declines in revenue and domes-
tic expenditure, which were in turn due to the 
deterioration in the terms of trade, the higher 
interest rates, the reduction or elimination of 
external financing, and ineffective adjustment 
policies. During the second adjustment pro-
gramme in Brazil (1983) wages were cut by 
decree; in Argentina they were frozen; Chile 
took various steps to reduce wages; and in Mex-
ico they declined as a result of increases lower 
than the inflation rate. 
The data on the variations in national wages 
are a good indicator of what happened to farm 
wages, for farm wages follow movements in 
national wage levels very closely. According to 
the quantitative information available, national 
wage levels have declined in real terms from 
their levels at the beginning of the 1970s. 
Other information indicates the generalized 
nature of the drop in real farm wages between 
1980 and 1985. This drop has meant an average 
loss of 15 % in their purchasing power, and this 
has exacerbated rural poverty. Construction and 
public sector earnings seems to have undergone 
a slightly less sharp decline (table 1). 
Farming enterprises have sought by reduc-
ing their wages bill to offset the increase in the 
other components of production costs, to keep 
their profit levels relatively stable and to pre-
serve their production vitality. They have thus 
favoured temporary farm work over permanent 
employment. The high rates of farm and rural 
underemployment have in turn contributed to 
the drop in real farm wages. 
b) The impact on farm production 
performance 
In the 1970s the region's farming sector 
grew at 3.5% a year, as against 5.9% for the 
economy as a whole and 6.3% for manufactures. 
These different growth rates reflect the gradual 
decline in importance of the region's agriculture 
in the gross domestic product of Latin America 
and the Caribbean in relation to the contribu-
Table 1 





























Source: Prepared by the Joint ECI.AC/FAO Agriculture Division 
on the basis of PRIÏALC, data from each country. 
"Variations between extreme years in the simple averages ¡n 12 
countries for industrial wages, 19 for minimum wages, 14 for 
construction wages, 9 for public wages, and 16 for farm wages. 
tions of industry and services, which is what 
normally happens as the development process 
advances. This relative decline does not conceal 
the fact that regional agriculture increased its 
absolute economic size and improved its gradual 
integration in overall development through 
more complex intersectoral and international 
links. 
The historical trends of overall and sectoral 
growth changed between 1980 and 1986 because 
the region's industry was the sector most 
affected by the crisis and the adjustment process: 
its growth was 0.4% a year, while agriculture 
continued to expand, although at a slower rate. 
The regional farm product increased by 1.7% a 
year, while the economy as a whole achieved 
barely 1%. In 1986 the farm product fell —by 
2.2% over 1985— but the causes of this decline 
included the familiar effects of bad weather in 
many countries of the region, in the same period 
the region's per capita product had growth rates 
of -1.9% in manufactures, -0.6% in agriculture, 
and -1.3% in the system as a whole. As a result, 
agriculture slightly increased its share in the 
total regional GDP between 1983 and 1985, but 
in 1986 it returned to its pre-crisis level 
(table 2). 
The better relative performance of agricul-
ture was associated with two circumstances. 
Since a high percentage of farm products are 
internationally tradeable, agriculture benefitted 
from the shifts in exchange-rate and trade poli-
cies and increased the physical volume of its 
exports. (Farming's export volume increased 
2 3 % between 1980 and 1985.) Moreover, the 
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sector was less affected than the rest of the 
economy by the contraction of domestic demand; 
the average income elasticities of foodstuffs are 
usually low —between 0.3 and 0.4%— and 
therefore the decline in average domestic spend-
ing (which was around 13% between 1979-1981 
and 1982-1985) did not have a severe effect on 
the sector's output. 
Table 3 shows the development of the 
region's farm output between 1980 and 1986. 
Tradeable crops —particularly imports 
substitutes— were the ones which grew most 
strongly in this period; the most dynamic crops 
were sugar cane and sugar beet, followed by 
grains and oil crops. Products intended mainly 
for domestic consumption increased more 
slowly; legumes, roots and tubers increased fas-
ter than in the last decade, while vegetables and 
fruit had a slower rate of increase. The produc-
tion of stimulant beverages was varied. Lives-
tock production grew more slowly, particularly 
in the case of beef, milk and eggs. 
The output of oil crops, stimulant beverages, 
fibres, sugar cane and legumes declined in 1986, 
but livestock showed a slight increase. As 
pointed out above, bad weather was the reason 
for much of the 1986 fall in output, which was 
generally disappointing. 
'The growth rate of the region's farm output 
was in step with that of the area of land culti-
vated (1.9% a year between 1980 and 1986), 
which in turn coincided with the rate of expan-
sion of the cultivated area in the 1970s. Analysis 
of the changes in the cultivated area and yields 
indicates that between 1980 and 1985 the pro-
ductivity of the land in respect of grains, coffee 
Table 2 
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Source: Prepared by the Joint ECLAC/FAO Agriculture Division from the national accounts data of ECLAC's Statistics and Quantitative 
Analysis Division. 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA:" EVOLUTION OF FARM OUTPUT, 1970-1986 
Crops 
Grains 










































































































































































































Source: Prepared by the joint KCLAC/FAO Agriculture Division from FAO data. 
"Includes countries within ECLAC's geographical region. 
Includes all available output for whatever use. 
includes all available output for whatever use, except seeds and feeds. 
and sugar cane grew at a faster rate than the 
average for the 1970s; oil crops continued to 
show a large increase, although smaller than in 
that decade; roots and tubers remained at stand-
still, and maize showed a big drop. 
The total regional supply of farm products5 
fell in 1982 and even further in 1983, but it 
recovered in 1984 and more so in 1985. Further-
more, the structure of the supply of farm pro-
ducts changed as a result of the slower growth of 
exports in the 1970s as compared with imports 
—a trend which was reversed between 1982 and 
1985 when export volumes rose and import 
volumes fell against a background of slow 
regional growth in output. Factors influencing 
this smaller supply were the cutback in imports 
by about 50%, the 30% decline in output, and 
the 20% increase in export volumes. 
The result of adding OOP and imports and subtracting 
exports. 
The importance of farm exports in the total 
value exported by the region is well known. They 
accounted for 47% of the total in 1970 and 
around 35% in 1980, but this share fell to 30% 
in 1985 despite a larger volume of farm exports. 
The region has traditionally been a net exporter 
of farm products, but as imports grew faster in 
the 1960s4 agriculture's net foreign trade balance 
had been declining, although this trend did 
change from 1981. In 1984-1985 the positive 
balance was in the order of US$6 500 million at 
1970 prices and US$22 100 million at current 
prices. 
The pre-crisis imports trend was deter-
mined by several factors, notably the overvalua-
tion of the real exchange rate, the tariff 
preferences granted for food imports, changes in 
'They accounted for 8'Zf of the domestic supply of farm 
products in 1970, W/< in 1978 and almost \Y7, in 1980, before 
falling back to IOC? in 1985. 
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the patterns of food consumption associated 
with urbanization and metropolization, exports 
subsidies in the developed countries and the very 
favourable terms of financing on which these 
purchases were negotiated; all these causes 
worked together to produce the steady decline in 
the net foreign trade balance of the region's 
agriculture. Food imports accounted for about 
three quarters of the region's total imports of 
farm products. To take another example, in 1978 
it took only 32% of the region's farm exports to 
equal in value the total of farm imports; this 
ratio rose to 47% in 1981 and fell to 33% in 
1985.5 
The positive farm trade balance increased 
during the adjustment period in only a few coun-
tries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, 
and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica and 
Honduras. In another large group of countries 
this balance fell and it rose in deficit countries 
such as Bolivia and Haiti, except in Mexico and 
Venezuela which experienced this situation but 
reduced their deficits. Only Chile and Peru of the 
deficit countries managed to move from deficit 
to surplus; in the case of Chile in particular this 
was due both to the drastic cutback in imports 
and to the increase in farm exports. 
In regional terms one third of the surplus of 
the few countries which improved their foriegn 
trade in farm products between 1982 and 1985 
was sufficient to equal the decline in the positive 
balances or the increasing deficits of the other 
countries. Accordingly, the region as a whole 
could show a relative improvement of about 
US$4 000 million in its trade balance for farm 
products in the period in question. 
Oil crops, wheat, maize, coffee and tobacco 
were the main export products to increase in 
volume between 1980 and 1985; these products 
came from only a few countries of the region. In 
contrast, the physical volume of exports of bana-
nas, cocoa, sugar and cotton fell, and this hurt a 
large group of countries heavily dependent on 
these exports. 
5
 A distinction must be drawn between the two main items in 
farm imports —foodstuffs and intermediate goods for 
agriculture— in view of their different purposes. Strictly from the 
standpoint of the needs of the farm production process itself, the 
sector used one out of every US$1 Ü earned by its exports; from the 
perspective of its function of feeding the countries' peoples, agri-
culture's contribution to the national supplies of foreign exchange 
is only one out of every two dollars of exports. 
The reduction in imports resulting from the 
adjustment affected mainly maize and wheat; 
imports of sugar, meat and dairy products also 
declined, with consequences for the domestic 
food supply. The imports of oils of most of the 
countries of the region did not fall between 1980 
and 1985; the widespread increase in the import 
demand for oils accounted for 25% of the rise in 
the exports of these products achieved by Brazil 
and Argentina. 
The adjustment process and the drop of 
around 20% in the unit price of international 
farm trade meant a reduction of almost 
US$4 500 million in the region's farm imports 
between 1982 and 1985. Almost the whole of the 
excess imports which had displaced competing 
national products was absorbed, so that these 
imports increased their share in meeting the 
effective demand. On the other hand, the reduc-
tion in the import volumes of intermediate 
goods for agriculture and their higher cost in 
national currencies affected the rate of use of 
productive resources and the effective expansion 
of farm production capacity. 
The decline in nominal international prices 
between 1980 and 1986 meant that the average 
level of the region's unit prices for exports and 
imports in the period was similar to the 1977 
level. This decline was influenced by the revalua-
tion of the dollar at the beginning of this decade 
and the sustained expansion of world food pro-
duction resulting from the overproduction in the 
developed countries, the increase in the self-
sufficiency index of Asian countries which were 
formerly net importers of food, and the overpro-
duction of grains in some African countries. To 
this was added the saturation of some world 
markets, the growth of protectionism and 
export subsidies in developed countries, and the 
conflicts between farmers of North America and 
the European Economic Community which led 
to changes in some of their price policies. 
The increase in the volume of farm exports 
was due to the fact that the output available for 
export was generally bigger than the amount 
actually exported, as well as to the adjustments 
of the real exchange rate, the reduction and elim-
ination of taxes on farm exports, the invest-
ments and the technological changes made in 
agriculture at the end of the last decade, and the 
recent fall in the value of the dollar. As some of 
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these determinants of the growth of exportable 
products weakened or ceased to operate, the 
physical volumes of exports were more openly 
affected by movements in international prices, 
and this apparently began to happen from 1986. 
The available quantitative and qualitative 
information leads to the conclusion that the 
region's agriculture was damaged by the adjust-
ment to a comparatively lesser extent than other 
sectors of the national economies. However, it 
must be pointed out that four or five years is not 
a sufficiently long period for an effective assess-
ment of what has happened in agriculture as a 
result of the adjustment and, in particular, of the 
capacity of the various production agents in 
farming to respond —as measured by changes in 
the production structure— to the changes in the 
macroeconomic variables and in the specific pol-
icies for the sector. 
The fact that the sector's output continued to 
grow during the adjustment process, albeit at a 
slower rate, indicates an anticyclical perfor-
mance by agriculture. There are a number of 
hypotheses which help to explain this pheno-
menon, including in particular the shifts in rela-
tive prices in favour of tradeable products which 
might have begun to influence the production 
growth rate; the fundamental necessity of food 
supply, which meant that the demajid for food-
stuffs declined less than the overall aggregate 
demand; the adoption and recent introduction of 
policy measures to offset certain expected effects 
of the macroeconomic policies; the increase in a 
number of products favoured by selective credits 
—in some cases subsidized— which amounted 
to exceptions to the restrictive macroeconomic 
policies; the weakness of the links between agri-
culture and the other economic sectors, which 
prevented the production cutback in those sec-
tors from having a severe impact on agriculture; 
the biological nature of agriculture and a degree 
of inertia in the production performance that 
might reasonably have been expected at the 
beginning of the adjustment. 
The disruption and uncertainty in the inter-
national and national economies in recent years 
and favourable or unfavourable weather condi-
tions and other natural phenomena sow ambi-
guity and doubt in an analysis of regional scope. 
There is therefore justification for including 
some examples of concrete national production 
performances which illustrate the effects of the 
adjustment with greater clarity. 
Before the crisis the development of soybean 
production (Brazil and Argentina) had 
depended basically on technical innovations in 
the production process, so that its long-term 
course can hardly have been affected by the pol-
icy measures adopted for purposes of the adjust-
ment. Similarly, the development of rice 
production in Peru, Colombia and Ecuador 
depended to a large extent on the improved 
technologies introduced, which mitigated the 
potential effects of the adjustment on this crop. 
The rapid long-term development of poultry 
farming, which was a common factor in the 
region, was determined mainly by technological 
innovations and the dynamic trend of domestic 
demand, which had a locomotive effect on the 
production of raw materials for poultry feed; the 
contraction of aggregate demand and the fall in 
wages and personal income during the reces-
sionary adjustment clearly altered this course. 
Producers of grains and oils in Argentina were 
subjected to measures to reduce the increases in 
their income resulting from changes in the real 
exchange rate and improvement of physical out-
put, with a view to holding the profitability of 
these operations at fairly stable levels. 
The development of traditional basic crops 
for domestic consumption —tubers in Peru, 
Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador, maize for human 
consumption in Mexico, Peru and Ecuador, and 
beans in Brazil, Mexico and Colombia— which 
were produced to a large extent by peasant 
farmers and had also suffered a long downward 
trend in consumption, continued to be affected 
by these factors, with apparently little impact 
from the recession. Technological change has 
been marginal in these crops. 
The expansion of livestock in Ecuador, 
which had been heavily influenced by the 
rolling-back of the agricultural frontier and the 
incorporation of new land, was apparently not 
affected to any great extent by the adjustment 
policies. However, in the long term these poli-
cies may have considerable adverse effects on 
present patterns of livestock production in many 
countries of the region. 
The recent development of fruit-growing in 
Chile is a result of the successful confluence of a 
number of factors such as the efficient and syste-
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matic formulation and implementation of a spe-
cial promotion programme, the continuation of 
an exports-oriented exchange-rate policy, a con-
stantly expanding external market and many 
exogenous economies generated by the techno-
logical innovations incorporated by producers, 
marketers and exporters. The same thing hap-
pened in the case of forestry production. 
c) The effects on agricultural production 
agents 
The macroeconomic management asso-
ciated with the adjustment has affected agricul-
tural production agents in different ways; it 
altered the economic environment in which the 
agribusiness economy was accustomed to oper-
ate, and at the same time agribusiness was com-
pelled to grapple with the more costly servicing 
of its own massive debt. Some indicators show 
that the drop in output in this important section 
of the farming economy was the reason for the 
slow growth rate of the sector's regional output, 
especially in 1982 and 1983. In these years the 
adverse effects of the bad weather in several 
countries made an obvious contribution to the 
decline in the output of the region's agriculture. 
The agribusiness economy oriented towards 
the domestic market suffered uncertainty and 
reduced profits, mainly as a result of the higher 
cost of inputs and other imported means of pro-
duction and of the increased cost of money, 
which was not always offset by price increases 
and cuts in real farm wages. The strength of 
production activities was on the one hand 
affected by the overall drop in aggregate demand 
and, on the other hand, stimulated by the possi-
bilities of imports substitution resulting from 
the decline in foreign purchases of farm 
products. 
The agribusiness economy focused basically 
on exporting was favoured by devaluations, 
access to improved technological options, 
declines in real wages, and progress in market-
ing logistics. These favourable factors were 
offset by the large and sustained fall in interna-
tional prices and by other external market res-
trictions (notably protectionism), by the 
increased cost of the imported component and of 
money, and by the cutback in the volume of 
credit. 
Medium-sized farmers, and more so small 
farmers, who were closer to the peasant econ-
omy, also cut their output, but to a lesser extent 
than the big businesses, for they generally have 
less recourse to official lending and their output 
is linked to the expanding demand of the urban 
consumption of processed foods and diversified 
exports and to the substitution of imports. This 
business sector, the importance of which in 
national production is variable but generally 
considerable, was certainly one reason why the 
decline was smaller in the region's agricultural 
production than in other production sectors of 
the national economies. 
Peasant agriculture suffered greater damage 
than the agribusiness economy owing to an 
accumulation of factors that worked against it: 
the cutback in subsidized lending; the decline in 
public agricultural and rural investment and 
other kinds of public spending connected with 
rural development programmes; the temporary 
drop in the domestic demand for some of its 
main production items; the lower remuneration 
of waged labour, which made up a large part of 
the family income; the decline in seasonal work 
owing to the production cutback in the agribusi-
ness sector, and the higher cost of imported 
technical inputs commonly used in some peasant 
operations. 
The economic characteristics and rationality 
of peasant farming itself ensured that it would 
continue to produce and supply basic foods, vir-
tually in accordance with its long-term trends. 
This is why the bulk of national production of 
basic consumer foodstuffs has not declined very 
much, except in countries where the agribusi-
ness economy accounts for a large proportion of 
the production of some of these foods. 
d) The effects on the structure of farming 
policies 
The structure of farming policies has been 
altered in most of the countries of the region. As 
stated earlier, a fairly standard farming policy 
prevailed up to the beginning of the 1980s, made 
up of a "package" of economic and financial 
policy incentives which directed, regulated and 
stimulated the growth of the sector's output and 
productivity. This "package" was backed up by 
transfers of income by means of public invest-
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ment in agriculture, programmes of technical 
support for production, and social benefits in 
rural areas. The summary versions of the coun-
try papers which are included in this Review 
give an idea of the differing degrees to which the 
recessionary adjustment has disturbed —or even 
dislocated— the functioning of the elements in 
this pattern which had gradually been estab-
lished to compensate for or correct the bias 
against agriculture involved in the development 
strategies and macroeconomic management pol-
icies devised and implemented in the pre-crisis 
period to give preferential support to protected 
industry. 
The lesser protection afforded to agriculture 
had to be reconciled with policy measures 
designed to keep food prices down by reason of 
their importance in urban-industrial develop-
ment. The general prices policy was itself used as 
a vigorous mechanism for guaranteeing the 
supply of economic resources from agriculture to 
the rest of the economy. This goal was promoted 
by the continual revaluation of the.real exchange 
rate, which had a powerful impact on the diver-
gent growth rates of non-farm and farm produc-
tivity. In other words, the general economic 
policy was a powerful determinant of the differ-
ing profit levels of industry and agriculture, with 
the latter usually lower. 
But since at the same time it was necessary 
for agricultural production for export and for 
home consumption to increase, the low level of 
farm profits was offset by specific economic 
incentives which acted directly or indirectly on a 
broad range of products or groups of products. 
This marked the emergence of the familiar mea-
sures to reduce production costs, and cuts were 
made to differing extents and by different means 
in the cost of imported and locally produced 
intermediate goods and in the cost of the capital 
needed to expand its formation in the country-
side and to cover the operating costs of crop and 
livestock production. Tax exemptions were 
introduced and direct subsidies and grants were 
often used, stimulating increased production of 
certain crops. At the same time government 
intervention in production was gradually being 
intensified in food production, processing and 
distribution. The public agricultural apparatus 
was expanded, diversified and specialized to 
ensure the efficiency of government control and 
regulation and the provision of technical sup-
port and rural social services. 
The changes experienced by the majority of 
the national economies in basic areas of their 
operation as a result of the crisis and the adjust-
ment were accompanied by major shifts in the 
development of their agriculture. When the ear-
lier cushion of compensatory or corrective mea-
sures was reduced or removed, agriculture came 
to depend increasingly on the individual and 
collective impact of the macroeconomic mea-
sures associated with the adjustment. 
The changes made with respect to trade and 
tariffs, monetary policy, credit and interest rates, 
prices, taxation and public expenditure implied 
alterations in the structure, intensity and selec-
tivity of the subsidies granted to agriculture to 
increase its profitability. The summary versions 
of the country papers mentioned earlier show 
how in several cases all these subsidies were 
eliminated, in others considerably reduced, and 
in only a very few countries merely slightly 
altered. It is not the purpose of this article to 
present a composite picture of the national situa-
tions that emerged. The aim is only to indícate 
the direction and strength of factors which gen-
erally had the effect of increasing production 
costs. The decline in real farm wages helped to 
reduce or neutralize this cost increase but at the 
same time it made living conditions in rural 
areas worse. Both the social tensions generated 
in the countryside by the drop in the income of 
the farm labour force and the overindebtedness 
of farm businessmen argue for a concomitant 
adjustment of farm prices. 
The devaluations of the real effective 
exchange rate have helped to readjust the rela-
tive prices of most externally tradeable products. 
Domestic food prices have also been freed, to 
varying degrees, from control and regulation; at 
the same time, support prices have been estab-
lished or re-established for the products consi-
dered strategic or basic for popular 
consumption, albeit by the setting of price bands 
or a single price. 
The governments have little room for 
manoeuvre within the loan agreements with the 
IMF with respect to reducing farm production 
costs by means of the policy and institutional 
intervention usually employed for this purpose. 
In the present circumstances, on the other hand, 
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it is hoped that agriculture will be able from its 
own resources and despite its debt to make better 
use of its production potential, increase its out-
put and improve the international competitive-
ness of its exports and import substitutes. This 
hope is based on the fact that in the long term 
farm output has grown fairly strongly and 
shown a great capacity to adapt to the changing 
and generally unfavourable conditions of the 
domestic and foreign markets, to accomodate 
itself to the familiar restrictions and shortcom-
ings in its capital formation, and to overcome the 
lack of sectorally balanced macroeconomic poli-
cies. A relative change is also expected in the 
composition of the factors of production, in the 
sense that the technologies will be less demand-
ing of capital and more intensive use will be 
made of the labour force —a change that will 
bring some advantages for medium-sized and 
small farms. 
The fairly widespread elimination of sources 
of preferential financing for agriculture and the 
continuation of high real interest rates in several 
countries have meant that the production pro-
cess depends to a greater extent on the self-
financing of farming enterprises. The changes 
made in this respect will modify the production 
structure, especially for exportable and import-
substitution crops vis-a-vis domestic consump-
tion crops, and between crops and livestock, and 
more land will be available for renting. 
Many countries have reduced or eliminated 
the indirect subsidies afforded to farm produc-
tion by the adjustment of the prices of imported 
machinery and agrochemical inputs, fuel, lubri-
cants, and rural electricity supply; this has been a 
factor in the increase of production costs. Situa-
tions have thus arisen which have accentuated 
the inherent risks of farming and the uncertainty 
about the profitability of various crops and lives-
tock products. 
It has already been pointed out that the res-
triction of public spending has had serious 
adverse effects on State programmes to promote 
production, training, research, extension, forma-
tion of co-operatives, agrarian reform, and rural 
settlement and development. These pro-
grammes have been watered down or trimmed 
back, and in some cases they have been subjected 
to thorough review in order to improve their 
effectiveness and prune their administration. 
The performance of State bodies concerned 
with the marketing of farm products has been 
affected by two superimposed situations which 
boosted each other's effects: the fiscal burden 
which substantially reduced the operational and 
financial resources of these bodies and the 
increasing questioning to which they have been 
subjected with respect to their operational effi-
ciency and their effectiveness in attaining the 
established goals, which were often mutually 
contradictory or bore no reasonable relationship 
to the resources available. 
As a result, a large proportion of the State 
marketing bodies have undergone major 
changes which in extreme cases have led to their 
winding up. It must be remebered that these 
bodies, with all their great diversity of structure, 
have played an important role in the supply of 
basic grains and, to a lesser extent, meat, dairy 
products, sugar and soybeans. In Mexico and 
Peru it is apparently still the intention to streng-
then them. 
Among the repercussions of the adjustment 
on the institutional framework established for 
the development of agriculture and the market-
ing of its products, attention must be drawn to 
the elimination of monopolies in the marketing 
of the main foodstuffs and the gradual or abrupt 
reduction of consumer subsidies. Projects have 
emerged in several countries for the establish-
ment of farm-product exchanges with the inten-
tion of reducing the degree of State intervention 
in the marketing of food products and enabling 
the private sector to supplement or take over, 
depending on the country, the activities of State 
agricultural marketing bodies. 
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III 
Final comments 
The available quantitative indicators justify the 
conclusion that during the crisis and the reces-
sionary adjustment the region's agriculture was 
damaged comparatively less than other sectors 
of the national economies. The decline in its 
output was strongly influenced by the large and 
sustained drop in the international prices of the 
main farm products exported by the region and 
the bad weather which affected several countries 
in 1982, 1983 and 1986. 
Even in these circumstances the region's 
agriculture made a considerable contribution to 
the improvement of the balance of payments. 
The net balance of Latin America's external 
farm trade was almost US$24 000 million 
between 1982 and 1985, while the net balance of 
the region's total foreign trade was about 
US$29 000 million in the same period; in other 
words, the farm surplus accounted for 82% of 
the total regional surplus resulting from the 
recessionary adjustment. This large contribution 
was due both to a vigorous cutback in farm 
imports —about US$16 000 million— and to 
the sustained increase in the volume of farm 
exports, which unfortunately did not bring the 
countries of the region foreign currency earnings 
proportionate to the increased production and 
export effort made in those years. 
The agriculture sector helped to prevent 
aggravation of national inflation rates, for its 
output continued to rise, although at a slower 
rate; this rate was fairly close to the rate of 
increase of total aggregate demand, which also 
fell during the adjustment. 
The decline in farm imports encouraged the 
effective and competitive substitution of 
imports of food and certain intermediate goods 
for farm production. Although it is not yet possi-
ble to make a clear assessment of the magnitude 
of the farm imports substitution effort made by 
the region as a whole, it is nevertheless obvious 
that the trend towards increased external food 
dependence was halted. There are signs that in 
the medium and long terms imports substitution 
may come to exercise a strong influence on the 
transformation of the structure of agricultural 
production. 
The disruptive and vacillating nature and 
the defects of the policies adopted during the 
adjustment process generally damaged the 
national farming economies. Similarly, the 
inability or refusal of the State to continue to 
sustain the bulk of the economic incentives 
established earlier specifically for agriculture 
brought added uncertainty to farming and 
impaired its profitability. 
The instability of farm profits or the disap-
pearance of a good part of them placed in a very 
difficult situation those big and medium-sized 
enterprises which had overborrowed. They also 
contributed to the decline in the sector's real 
wages and accentuated the trend for change in 
the nature of farm work, which is reflected in the 
gradual replacement of permanent workers with 
temporary ones. 
The crisis and the adjustment process have 
caused a drop in the real incomes of small pro-
ducers and landless farm workers. This situation 
has been accentuated by some retention of labour 
in the countryside as a result of the interruption 
—certainly a temporary one— of the age-old 
migration from the country to the town. In some 
countries agriculture has even become a refuge 
for redundant urban population seriously 
affected by the fall in its income. The rural labour 
markets have been altered by the large increase 
in the number of workers seeking jobs. 
The adjustment of the real exchange rate has 
been the instrument of macroeconomic policy 
with greatest potential positive impact on agri-
culture's economic performance. The devalua-
tions will have compensated producers fully or 
in part for the drop in prices in the international 
farm markets. The deterioration of the terms of 
trade considerably impaired the modifying effect 
on the relative prices of tradeable and non-
tradeable farm goods that adjustment of the real 
exchange rate might have produced. Relatively 
few farm products were sold abroad at fairly 
stable prices and without market restrictions. 
The positive effect of the exchange-rate and 
trade policies on tradeable farm production was 
offset by the higher cost of farm imports in the 
national currencies resulting from monetary 
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policy designed to cut back total aggregate 
demand —the amount of official lending to agri-
culture was reduced and the interest rate was 
raised— and from the restriction of real spend-
ing, which included a large reduction of the State 
budget deficit and caused massive cuts in govern-
ment expenditure in support of agricultural 
growth and rural social development. These cuts 
have had adverse effects on investment and tech-
nological change in agriculture and on the condi-
tion of the rural poor. 
The various macroeconomic adjustments 
and their individual and combined effects have 
generally produced changes in the structure, 
intensity and selectivity of the direct and indirect 
subsidies and other resource transfers formerly 
included in the specific agricultural policies 
designed to improve farm profits and alleviate 
rural poverty. The serious weakening —¡n some 
cases the actual break-up— of the earlier fairly 
common pattern of agricultural policy has dis-
rupted, to differing degrees depending on the 
country, the economic and financial environ-
ment in which national agriculture was develop-
ing, as well as the management of the public 
agricultural apparatus and its status as an agent 
for intervention in the development of the sec-
tor's economy and in the level of welfare of 
production agents in agriculture. 
In these circumstances farm profits, which 
until a short time ago depended on the amount 
of the subsidies designed to reduce production 
costs and stimulate increased productivity, have 
come to depend heavily on the unadjusted prices 
of physical inputs, the effective cost of money, 
lower wages for the work force, and other factors 
which determine price levels, which are certainly 
what induce economic agents to carry on their 
production activities. 
The macroeconomic management policies 
associated with the adjustment have now been in 
place for some years, and more years will cer-
tainly pass before there is any loosening of the 
restrictions resulting from the foreign debt. It is 
still too early to say whether the crisis and the 
adjustment have had the virtue of introducing 
more profound and permanent changes in the 
public management of agriculture —as a result 
of the combination of macroeconomic and sec-
toral decisions— which will produce more bal-
anced sectoral conditions for the development of 
this activity, so that it will no longer be necessary 
to offset the harmful effects of distorted price 
systems. In those circumstances the real 
exchange rate, the overall structure of prices and 
taxes, the level of real wages, and effective 
improvements in productivity and competitive-
ness would determine the sector's profitability 
and have a profound influence on the modifica-
tion of the present production structure. A corol-
lary of all this would be the elimination or 
substantial alteration of one of the basic func-
tions assigned to agriculture; that of furnishing 
part of its economic surplus to facilitate accumu-
lation in other sectors of activity, especially in 
industry. 
That alternative, the real possibilities and 
economic and social implications of which have 
not yet been adequately explored, would mean 
that the crisis and adjustment had generated 
—implicitly, for there have been no concrete 
government statements on the matter— trans-
formations affecting the very essence of agricul-
tural growth, which would have different bases 
of support and operation in the future. 
If instead the changes which have occurred 
and are still occurring prove to be fairly transi-
tory and the long-prevailing pattern of agricul-
tural growth is re-established to some extent, 
strong pressures will emerge for a return to 
subsidized treatment for agriculture to offset the 
adverse effects of global development strategies 
and national economic policies. 
The present macroeconomic picture in the 
region is characterized by poor economic 
growth, a very large foreign debt, resurgent 
inflation, disruption and uncertainty at the 
world and national levels, and weakening of the 
foreign demand for the region's export goods, 
with a consequent worsening of its terms of 
trade, which are now more unfavourable than at 
any time since 1930. 
These elements of the crisis will apparently 
not change much in the medium term and they 
will therefore shape the region's economic pros-
pects, which in turn will frame and determine 
the future development of the countries' agricul-
ture. The policies devised for macroeconomic 
purposes will assuredly assign to agriculture the 
main task of continuing to contribute to an 
important extent to the generation and supply of 
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foreign exchange and to the domestic supply of 
foodstuffs and other farm products needed by 
agro-indus try. The performance of these func-
tions will depend mainly on the decisions taken 
with respect to the real exchange rate, prices 
policy, taxation, incomes and wages, and real 
expenditure. All these policy decisions will indi-
vidually and jointly affect the vitality of produc-
tion for export, for imports substitution, and for 
home consumption. 
In this last respect the sharp contraction of 
domestic demand for farm products in recent 
years must not be forgotten. This demand grew 
at a rate of over 4% a year in 1970-1980 but the 
rate fell to less than 1.5% a year between 1980 
and 1986. It is well established that any future 
expansion of the domestic demand for food 
—the main component in the domestic demand 
for farm products, which virtually determines 
their growth rate— will depend in simple terms 
on the rates of increase of the population, the per 
capita income, and the income elasticity of farm 
products. Since in the immediate.future the run-
away growth of the region's population will 
decline and the annual growth of the regional 
per capita income will certainly be lower than in 
the 1970s, it may be supposed that the domestic 
food demand will increase until the end of the 
century at a rate below 3% a year. 
World trade ín farm products is also passing 
through a crisis caused by the interaction of the 
farming policies adopted by the industrialized 
countries —which have had a marked effect on 
the level and movement of world farm prices 
and on the volume and structure of world 
trade— and by the sharp contraction of the 
international demand for farm goods in the early 
1980s associated with the world economic reces-
sion. All these circumstances have meant that 
the region has had to cope with adverse external 
structural conditions aggravated by temporary 
situations which rendered them even more unfa-
vourable. The fact that the farm exports pros-
pects of the countries of the region are generally 
unpromising in respect of prices and volumes 
(which will certainly encourage the countries to 
miss no relevant opportunity, however marginal 
it may seem) lends weight to the potential role of 
the domestic market as a stimulus of increased 
farm output in the immediate future in its 
national, subregional and regional aspects. This 
does not remove the need repeatedly to stress 
the interdependence between the economic 
growth of the region's agriculture and interna-
tional farm trade in supporting and strengthen-
ing the development process. 
The foreseeable moderate expansion of the 
aggregate demand for farm products will in turn 
offer smaller incentives for growth of the 
region's agriculture —a disappointing prospect 
aggravated by the lack of attraction which the 
curtailed public investment in agriculture has 
recently been exercising for private investment. 
It will therefore be essential to confront with 
imagination and vigour these restrictions, which 
will be difficult to overcome, if the aim is effec-
tively to improve the productivity and competi-
tiveness of agriculture. 
It is hardly necessary to stress that the deci-
sive factors which represent serious obstacles to 
agricultural growth and rural social develop-
ment in the future will have to be given due 
weight in the design and application of macro-
economic and sectoral policies if the wish is to 
ensure that agriculture makes an important con-
tribution to the development of the economy 
and society in Latin America. To give priority to 
agriculture by reason of its function of support-
ing overall development will mean allocating 
and transferring to the sector the necessary 
resources for it to expand, improve and trans-
form its present production capacity and struc-
ture (which are the result of the distorting and 
corrective policies maintained throughout a 
fairly long period) and thus to alter the tradi-
tional habit of arguing that agriculture must 
support itself by its own resources and produc-
tive forces if it is consistently to increase its 
economic vitality and secure positive changes in 
its social structures. 
It is essential that in agriculture-based socie-
ties such as most Latin American societies prior-
ity must be given from the macroeconomic 
standpoint to investments focused on the most 
relevant and dynamic links between agriculture 
and industry and services, within the framework 
of a unifying, systematic and conservationist 
concept of farming policy whch reaches beyond 
the conventional limits of agriculture as an eco-
nomic sector. Such a policy will have to take 
explicitly into account the effects which the 
changing forms of social organization of produc-
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tion and the technological situation in industry 
are having on the transformation of the produc-
tion structure of agriculture. This will eliminate 
the familiar tendency to believe that the rela-
tionship between agriculture and industry is one 
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